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Demedicalizing misery: Welcoming the human paradigm in mental health nurse education 
 
Introduction 
In 2013 in the UK, the Division of Clinical Psychology (DCP)  of the British Psychological Society  
released a position statement. This called for a paradigm shift in mental health ‘towards a 
conceptual system that is no longer based on a “disease” model’ (Johnstone 2014, p15). The 
arguments for changed practice and understandings in this document are supported in 
contemporary critical mental health work at an international level (eg Bentall, 2010; Boyle and 
Johnstone, 2014;  Cromby et al., 2013; Johnstone, 2014; LeFrancois et al., 2013; Thomas, 2014).  
 
The authors of the DCP (2013) position statement do not deny the role of biology in mediating and 
enabling all forms of human behaviour and distress. They also acknowledge complex relationships 
between social, psychological and biological factors underpinning mental health problems (Cromby 
et al., 2013). Their key message is that there is a lack of empirical support for biology as a primary 
cause in what are currently commonly regarded as ‘functional’ mental health problems. Functional 
mental health problems, treated across the range of in-patient and community mental health 
services, are distinguishable from organic problems by an absence of signs of brain impairment.  
 
To date, no genes, biomarkers or evidence for disease processes have been convincingly identified 
for functional mental health problems. Instead, accepting the importance of evolved human biology 
and cultural mediators in patterns of human emotional reaction, an overwhelming amount of 
evidence points to the causal role of social and relational adversities in their development (Boyle and 
Johnstone, 2014; Cromby et al., 2013; Johnstone, 2014; Thomas, 2014). These adversities can be 
roughly divided into two groups: social circumstances subsume various forms of social inequality, 
such as unemployment, discrimination, poverty, poor housing and living environments, adverse 
events in childhood and adolescence, and social isolation. Relationship factors  include varieties of 
victimisation, emotional, physical and sexual abuse in childhood and adulthood, and loss and 
bereavement.  
 
It should be emphasised that ‘distress’ in the above context does not mean disease’ or ‘disorder’. For 
this reason, the position statement and related critical literature make clear that a change of 
language is needed to understand, conceptualise, research and help in alleviating human misery. In 
moving from technological to human paradigmatic understandings, narrative-based approaches, 
including the central role of formulation,  emerge as  a more credible way forward. 
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The Technological Paradigm 
The technological paradigm assumes that interlinked, faulty physiological, emotional and 
information processing mechanisms are key to understanding extremes of human misery (see 
Thomas, 2014). This assumption is reflected in an increasing colonization of human experience and 
behaviour by medical and psychiatric language. In various forms, biomedical understandings have 
generally dominated mainstream psychiatric theory and practice for 150 years (Thomas, 2014). Since 
the early 1950s however, psychiatric diagnosis has been more specifically spearheaded by the 
diagnostic development committee work of the American Psychiatric  Association (Johnstone, 2014). 
 
The technological paradigm privileges and promotes pharmaceutical and related psychological 
interventions that fit with its medicalized assumptions. These interventions are by definition 
context-independent in regarding  internal processes as causal in human distress. They can therefore 
be applied  relatively independently of concerns about the impact of relationships or personal values 
– information conveyed by service users in their narratives of lived experiences. It is therefore not 
surprising that such narratives are often regarded as andecdotal and/or diagnostically symptomatic, 
and therefore irrelevant to mainstream institutional psychiatric treatment (Johnstone, 2014; 
Thomas, 2014).  
 
The Human Paradigm 
In contrast, the emerging human  paradigm regards mental health  work and recovery from distress 
as embodied moral practice, grounded in material and cultural circumstances and personal histories 
and relationships. It therefore  values context and meaning as crucial in understanding human 
distress, and pays the utmost respect to how suffering people interpret and story their experiences 
of this (Boyle and Johnstone, 2014; Grant and Leigh-Phippard, 2014;  Grant et al., 2015; Johnstone, 
2014; Thomas, 2014).  
 
The human paradigm rests on the simple idea of human life as narrative. The concept of narrative or 
storied identity emerged as a philosophical concern in the second half of the 20th century, in the 
work of philosophers such as Rorty and MacIntyre, who argued that people’s lives are inescapably 
grounded in their experiences of time. So like novels or plays, but in much more messy ways, human 
lives have beginnings, middles and ends, and plots and sub-plots along the way. Our life narrative 
behaviours, experiences and decisions are thus only understandable to the extent that they are 
embodied in historical contexts. To put this more simply, what guides our understandings of 
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ourselves is knowledge of what  stories we’re in at any one point at time. Similarly, other people’s 
understandings of us inform how they locate us in their accounts of what we’re doing and our 
motivations behind our actions (Thomas, 2014). This has implications for what constitutes good 
mental health work: this arguably occurs when service user and worker stories about each other 
merge and chime sympathetically and in harmony, rather than jar in discord. 
 
Problems with the Technological Paradigm   
How well do psychiatric diagnostic systems fare as moral practices in storying lives from the 
perspective of the human paradigm and evidence-based scrutiny? They fall down  as both a credible 
categorising and coherent system in two major ways. The scientific criterion of reliability refers to 
the consistency of judgements made about mental health service users’ diagnoses. Diagnostic 
reliability emerges from the literature as consistently low, and influenced by such factors as different  
diagnostic preferences held by different psychiatrists (Johnstone, 2013; Thomas, 2014) and relatively 
unconscious judgements that reflect and reinforce white western norms about what constitutes 
culturally normal experiences and behaviours (Johnstone, 2013).  As a result of these and related 
factors, ‘People typically collect a whole range of diagnoses as they progress through the 
(psychiatric) system, and are often prescribed a whole range of different medications on the basis 
of…guesswork’ (Johnstone 2014, p23).  
 
Psychiatric diagnoses also fail on the scientific criterion of validity, or describing what actually exists. 
Given that, as described above, there are no sites of functional ‘mental illness’ that can be seen in 
human bodies, diagnostic categories do not describe things in the real world. Instead, diagnoses are 
made on the basis of psychiatrists’ and other mental health workers’ observations of people’s mood, 
thinking and related aspects of their subjective states (Johnstone, 2013; Thomas, 2014).  
 
Having the status of social and cultural, rather than medical or evidence-based, judgements, it is 
remarkable that diagnoses have endured to date as fundamental to the work of mental health 
nurses and their colleagues. In this context, the medicalized language used in diagnostic 
understandings – replete  as it is with terms such as ‘symptoms’, ‘illness’, ‘pathology’ and ‘prognosis’ 
– conceals an ideological rhetorical function. Reflecting and reifying lay assumptions, it is constantly 
accepted as the authoritative narrative, received and believed by many  service users and their 
carers:  that the former group are suffering from a diagnosable illnesses, perhaps caused by 
biochemical imbalances, best treated In hospitals, with medication prescribed and administered by 
doctors and nurses. 
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The Psychosocial Impact of Diagnosis  
Also concealed is the fact that there are problems related to psychiatric diagnosis at the level of 
relationships in and between professional and user communities. These result in incoherent stories 
conferred on the latter groups (Johnstone, 2014; Grant and Leigh-Phippard, 2014; Grant et al., 
2015). Johnstone (2014), for example, makes the point that when involved in mainstream 
institutional psychiatric services, service users are often caught in a double bind, reflected in the 
message that ‘although it’s not your fault that you are ill, you are responsible for your illness. You 
must therefore make the effort to get better (so long as you do it our way as we are the illness 
experts).’  
 
This, institutional-led rather than collaborative, recovery dynamic was further illuminated in a 
recent, internationally-focused integrative literature review of mental health service users’ 
experiences of mental health care. Newman et al. (2015) describe a lack of user involvement in the 
care planning process as a major finding. These authors argue that this stems from limited 
opportunities reported by users to express their views about both their care needs and what should 
be included in their care plans. They report that where this is achieved, service user involvement is 
often rarely implemented, in spite of policy directives to the contrary.  
 
This tension at the heart of care planning speaks to a related tension between the meaning of 
‘recovery’ at institutional psychiatric and service user levels, and arguably gives rise to circumstances 
where users may be judged on the basis of how well they comply with the dominant narratives of 
institutional psychiatry (Newman et al., 2015; Stacey and Stickley, 2012). Thus, users can be 
perceived as being either too dependent or non-compliant, lacking in insight through rejection of a 
diagnosis or too reliant on it and avoidant of life responsibilities. Overall, this proves to be a no-win 
situation for many service users, which contributes to why some make a reasoned choice to use 
deceit and subterfuge  to manage their relationships with the psychiatric services in the interests of 
their personal integrity (Grant and Leigh-Phippard, 2014; Grant et al., 2015; Johnstone, 2014). 
 
A further problem has been described as the ‘treatment barrier’. This refers to how, according to the 
logic of a diagnostic model of mental distress, problems are located within individuals rather than in 
social or relationship difficulties (Johnstone, 2014). This gives, for example, abusive partners licence 
to avoid culpability, and also enables mental health services to blame individuals for the 
intractability of their problems, without these services acknowledging the extent to which  
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involvement in psychiatric services has contributed to their development (Grant and Leigh-Phippard, 
2014; Grant et al., 2015). 
 
As mentioned above, if personal experiences are regarded as simply diagnostic symptoms,  there 
seems little reason for mental health professionals to make too much of an effort to explore their 
meanings.  As a result of this state of affairs,  ‘…people can spend years coming in and out of hospital 
without anyone sitting down and discussing their experiences and their distress in order to make 
sense of them.’ (Johnstone 2014, p.53). Reflecting monologic rather than dialogic organizational  
cultural styles in many mental health services, and a corresponding lack of collaborative care 
planning, people are often told  what their problems are.  In the absence of their involvement in 
discussions, or their agreement about how accurate this information feels to them, this can threaten 
relationships and trust between users and mental health workers, and the recovery process (Grant 
and Leigh-Phippard, 2014; Grant et al., 2015; Newman et al., 2015). 
 
Stopping people from telling their stories, thus having these stories respected and validated by 
mental health professionals, also relates to the ‘confirmation bias’ phenomenon, frequently 
occurring in mental health treatment settings (Thomas, 2014). This refers to the act of mental health 
workers actively selecting information from and about users of their service that fits their 
medicalized views of them.  Users in turn may well self-select when telling their stories to match 
these views, and mental health nurses  often see users’ neutral or contextually understandable 
behaviours in terms of the official psychiatric stories conferred on them. 
 
Emerging Human Paradigm Principles 
In light of the above, nurses should be taught to put ethics before technology as a fundamental 
overarching principle. In practice, this demands always privileging and according deep respect to the 
meaning and context of people’s suffering,  conveyed in narratives of the lived experience of  their 
distress (Johnstone, 2014; Stacey and Stickley, 2012; Thomas, 2014; Warne and McAndrew, 2007).  
 
Lived experience knowledge rather than diagnostic categories should therefore be the point of 
departure and major focus for mental health nurses in  understanding and helping people. The 
emerging dialogue then becomes the basis for the facilitated re-shaping of a person’s life based on a  
recovery relationship characterised by mutuality of trust (Grant and Leigh-Phippard, 2014; Grant et 
al., 2015; Johnstone, 2013, 2014; Thomas, 2014). Such dialogues, shaped as individual formulations 
of people’s problems, emerge as the viable alternative to diagnosis (DCP, 2013; Johnstone, 2013, 
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2014). Formulations should explicitly acknowledge the basis for an individual’s distress in social 
circumstances and relationship factors, the frequent significance of childhood adversity in broader 
contexts of social inequality (Thomas, 2014), and relevant social and cultural mediators, shapers and 
moderators of adversity (Boyle and Johnstone, 2014).  
 
However, as with psychiatric diagnostic judgements, the formulation process is intrinsically 
subjective and open to bias (Johnstone, 2013). That said, Johnstone argues that – as individual, open 
ended and  developing, accounts of human distress rather than diagnostic categories – formulations 
do not logically need to meet scientific standards of reliability and validity. Perhaps a more prescient 
potential problem is that, in line with enduring institutional trends, they may be developed 
unilaterally by mental health nurses and other workers, with insufficient respect paid to users’ 
narratives of lived experience. This highlights the current relevance of an editorial comment made 
almost a decade ago: that mental health nurses must be more collaborative  and thoughtful about 
the vocabulary they use for engaging with clients’ experiences (Happell 2007).  
 
In the service of recovery, the task of according narrative respect and developing formulations 
constructed in a de-medicalised language, mental health nurse educators need to help nurses 
develop increasingly more sophisticated levels of narrative competence. Celebrated and practiced to 
some degree in general medicine and psychiatry (Thomas, 2014), with corresponding work emerging 
in nursing and mental health nursing (Bach and Grant, 2015), this term refers to the capacity for 
human beings to deeply absorb, interpret, and appropriately respond to the stories of others. Such 
close attention facilitates methods for addressing users’ existential issues around inner hurt, despair, 
hope grief, and moral pain.  
 
In the broader context of facilitating emotional and transformation learning in mental health nurse 
education (Stacey and Stickley, 2012), narrative competence should privilege hearing over listening 
(Thomas, 2014). By carefully  attending to context, nuance and difference within and between 
people’s experiences of distress, narratively competent practice is helpful in engaging people who 
use mental health services in a  recovery process through which they are able to re-story their lives 
(Grant and Leigh-Phippard, 2014; Grant et al., 2015; Thomas, 2014).  
 
It should not however be assumed that narrative competence is a given in either the natural abilities 
or current training of mental health nurses. Nurses skilled and willing to exercise narrative 
competence in the spirit of recovery from an existential rather than institutional branding 
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perspective are often likely to do so in spite of rather than in line with their organisational realities of 
practice. They may arguably therefore be the exception rather than the rule in some mental health 
services (Grant and Leigh-Phippard, 2014; Grant et al., 2015). 
 
Implications  for Nurse Education 
To what extent do contemporary undergraduate mental health nurse curricula support and 
promulgate, or, conversely, violate the principles outlined above, at local and policy levels?  
Evidence-based mental health nursing practice and communicative competence  is fundamental to 
UK Nursing and Midwifery Council Standards for Pre-registration Nursing Education. However, in the 
light of my argument so far, in my own university, the biomedical approach to understanding mental 
health problems is taught alongside other models in mental health nurse education  with insufficient 
levels of criticality.  The extent to which this may be happening in other higher educational nursing 
programmes internationally, in the context of pharmaco-centric mental health nurse educational 
assumptions (Lakeman and Cutcliffe, 2009), is an open question.  
 
However, I am in possession of informally collected ethnographic data that speaks to this issue. 
Subsequent to the release of a recorded seminar of my demedicalizing mental health work on social 
media, a mental health curricular lead nurse academic from  a university in the north of England who 
had seen this recording contacted me early in 2015, to say: 
 
…we are in a double-bind. We might not be teaching the biomedical model as a ‘current 
model’, but more from a critical social history perspective, but that would not fit with 
practice. We often hear via students from their mentors about whether or not we teach 
nursing students what (mentors) view as being ‘needed in practice’ – ie psychiatric nursing 
practice. A question that arises for me then is: Can a ‘demedicalised nursing approach’… 
thrive and take root in clinical environments where this is not the accepted practice? Hence 
we have this rather unsatisfactory middle-ground where we tacitly condone the (biomedical) 
model to some extent by saying ‘well we shouldn’t be doing this; we shouldn’t be using this 
approach, but you’ll find yourself working in clinical areas where (it’s required).’ 
 
 
The power of the dominant service curricula described by this academic is also played out in the 
phenomenon of many student mental health nurses in my own institution continuing to talk almost 
exclusively in  the language of psychiatric diagnosis at the completion of their studies. For these 
students, and possibly others in different parts of the UK and elsewhere, this is perhaps not 
surprising. From a university in the south of England, two students who had also accessed my 
recording made contact with me. They told me about their experiences on a psychopharmacology 
module, within which they were taught, uncritically and in the absence of adequate supporting 
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evidence, that there is a ‘General agreement (of a) strong correlation between schizophrenia and 
over-activity of dopamine transmission hypothesis’ (bullet point from module powerpoint 
presentation, which they shared with me).  
 
 
Threats to Progress 
The sustained absence of evidence to support the technological paradigm’s medicalization of human 
distress as a convincing narrative begs the question as to why its exclusivity and hegemony has 
endured for so long. In this regard, the picture of competing academic and service curricula 
described above needs to be contextualised in  more powerful landscapes. It is clearly the case that 
psychiatric medication has played a major part in alleviating suffering in the 20th and 21st centuries. 
However, a consensus in the critical mental health literature is that the elective affinity between 
global corporate pharmaceutical and related interests and mainstream institutional psychiatry has 
played an exclusive role in determining constructions of reality  for  mental health service users and 
workers, and related research, professional and policy agendas underpinning these constructions. As 
an example, Lakeman and Cutcliffe (2009) point to unwarranted confidence in the biological 
causation of mental health problems and related pharmaco-centrism, expressed by some mental 
health nursing scholars in the absence of adequately supporting evidence. 
 
In this broad cultural context, psychiatric diagnosis may be regarded as a political device employed  
to legitimate social control activities which, if its ideological nature, cultural significance and lack of 
evidence-base were exposed, would arguably receive greater levels of critical  public scrutiny. 
Critique of its practices, assumptions and allegiances are already at its heart:  Johnstone (2014) 
describes how key people in the development and construction of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association have spoken out about 
the relationship between their diagnostic system, in its successive editions,  and its association with 
global pharmaceutical industries over the years. She also points out that over two-thirds of members 
of the advisory task force for the current edition have apparently been shown to have links to these 
industries. Enormous profits continue to be made by offering pharmacological solutions to human 
misery,  and these are key to the continuing development of the DSM and its burgeoning diagnostic 
categories.  
 
Finally, advancing social justice in mental health by exposing the above poses further challenges for 
positive change at the levels of professional education and access to welfare benefits. These, in turn 
mask wider social inequalities within which mental health nurses and their educators are implicated 
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through ‘guilt by association’. Currently the training and status of psychiatrists and nurses is justified 
by the diagnostic approach, while for service users psychiatric diagnoses carry with them the 
necessary exchange value for social security. It’s very hard to for people in the UK who experience 
extreme psychological distress to access benefits, social housing and other structural forms of social 
support without a diagnosis, while having one in the USA gives access to government health 
schemes such as Medicaid and medical insurance.  
 
From a social justice perspective, in spite of the obstacles to change, the arguments presented in this 
paper point up the need for furthering and developing human paradigm work in mental health nurse 
educational curricula, since: 
 
 … vulnerable and disturbed people are not always welcome as relatives, 
 friends or neighbours; it may suit all of us to see them as suffering from a medical 
 problem which is someone else’s role to treat. The alternative solutions – providing  
 housing and employment, tacking poverty, re-building communities –  
are far more challenging and expensive. 
       (Johnstone 2013, p113) 
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